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LENDER LIMBO: THE PERILS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LENDER LIABILITY
PAUL A. DOMINICK*
LEON C. HARMON**
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1980s was a decade of rapidly expanding environmental legis-
lation and regulation at both the federal and state levels. These laws
and regulations substantially increased the risks associated with real
estate loan transactions. The obvious goal of a lender is to make good,
collectible loans. In the past, appreciation of real estate could almost
be assumed. Consequently, a mortgage fully securing a debt usually al-
lowed a foreclosing lender to cover at least a substantial portion of the
principal loan amount. Now, when a hazardous waste problem exists
on the property, a security interest in real estate can be rendered
worthless and even become a liability beyond the amount of the loan.
Other loan transactions also can become problems when the financial
condition of the borrower is jeopardized by environmental enforcement
actions or citizen suits.
As with any rapidly developing area of law, many unanswered
questions exist which create potential pitfalls. A prudent lender, how-
ever, can position itself to avoid these potential pitfalls, as well as the
known trouble areas, presented by the environmental laws.
Two federal statutes constitute the major sources of liability for
the cleanup of contaminated land: the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund)1
and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).2 The South
Carolina General Assembly also has enacted three statutes which may
impose liability: the South Carolina Hazardous Waste Management
* Partner, Nexsen Pruet Jacobs & Pollard, Columbia, South Carolina, B.A., Univer-
sity of South Carolina, 1976; J.D., Washington and Lee University School of Law, 1979.
Mr. Dominick is a litigation attorney with experience in environmental cases.
** Special Counsel, Nexsen Pruet Jacobs & Pollard, Columbia, South Carolina,
B.S., Clemson University, 1971 (Chemical Engineering); J.D., Emory University School
of Law, 1982. Prior to entering law school, Mr. Harmon had twelve years of experience as
a professional engineer in the areas of environmental, chemical and energy engineering.
Mr. Harmon is an environmental attorney with experience in regulatory and litigation
matters.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
2. Id. §§ 6901-6992.
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Act;3 the South Carolina Pollution Control Act; and the South Caro-
lina Underground Petroleum Environmental Response Bank Act.' In
addition, various other federal statutes6 and common law theories7 can
potentially have an impact on real estate lending transactions.
II. COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION AND
LIABILITY ACT (CERCLA)
CERCLA is currently the primary statutory vehicle for imposing
lender liability for hazardous waste problems. Congress passed this Act
in response to several waste site discoveries in 1978, the most notorious
of which occurred at the Love Canal site in the state of New York.'
The Love Canal incident involved a school built atop an abandoned
canal into which highly toxic chemicals had been dumped for at least
ten years. The chemicals infiltrated homes as well as the school, and by
1978 the seriousness of health problems discovered in the area' led
President Carter to declare a state of emergency and the state of New
York to evacuate the area. 10 Public concern over Love Canal and simi-
lar hazardous waste emergencies resulted in the passage of CERCLA. 1
The strength of CERCLA is in the funding available for the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) to pay for cleanup costs when a
responsible party cannot be found or cannot be required to clean up
3. S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 44-56-10 to -510 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1989).
4. Id. §§ 48-1-10 to -350.
5. Id. §§ 44-2-10 to -140 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
6. See Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (1982 & Supp. V
1987); Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982 & Supp.
V 1987); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001 (1989) (OSHA's general asbestos regulations).
7. See Neal v. Darby, 282 S.C. 277, 318 S.E.2d 18 (Ct. App. 1984) (solvent reclama-
tion company's landfill a public nuisance); Davenport v. Woodside Cotton Mills Co., 225
S.C. 52, 80 S.E.2d 740 (1954) (unauthorized dumping of industrial waste a trespass).
8. See Lipper, Mortgage Acceleration: The Lender's Prescription for Avoiding the
Comprehensive Environmental Response Cleanup and Liability Act (CERCLA), 35 J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 129, 131 (1989).
9. See id. at 130 n.9.
10. Id. at 130 n.8 and accompanying text. Other incidents in 1978 occurred in
Toone, Tennessee, where residents found their water supply contaminated by a chemical
facility that had closed six years earlier, despite the assurances of government officials
that the water was safe to drink; near Charles City, Iowa, where EPA officials found the
Cedar River contaminated with poisons from a nearby dumpsite; and near Louisville,
Kentucky, where 6,000 of 17,000 drums disposed of by chemical manufacturers oozed
toxic chemicals into the ground. Id.
11. Enacted on December 11, 1980, CERCLA was a hastily drafted compromise at
the end of a lame duck session. See Grad, A Legislative History of The Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 J.
ENVTL. L. 1 (1982).
[Vol. 41
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the site. Originally, Congress authorized 2.2 billion dollars to fund
CERCLA from 1981 through 1985.2 In 1986 this funding was boosted
to 8.5 billion dollars when Congress enacted the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act (SARA). 3 Armed with this funding,
the EPA can proceed to clean up a hazardous waste site14 and then
take legal action against potentially responsible parties (PRP's) to re-
cover the funds actually expended on the cleanup.0 The EPA also may
request a federal district court to intervene by granting injunctive re-
lief against responsible parties when there is evidence of imminent and
substantial danger to the public health or welfare or to the
environment. 6
Any state agency which has entered into a cooperative agreement
to carry out investigative and response duties may exercise EPA au-
thority." In South Carolina, the Department of Health and Environ-
mental Control (DHEC) has such a cooperative agreement and is au-
thorized to implement and enforce CERCLA.18
An enforcing agency may respond to contamination by investiga-
tion, removal and any other remedial or response action consistent
with the National Contingency Plan.19 Any private party incurring
cleanup costs may also maintain an action against a legally responsible
party to recover those costs."0
There are four categories of persons or institutions who are poten-
tially liable for cleanup costs under CERCLA: (1) current owners or
operators of facilities with hazardous waste disposal sites; (2) any per-
son who owned or operated facilities with hazardous waste sites at the
time of disposal; (3) any person who contracts or arranges for disposal
of hazardous waste at a facility owned by another person; and (4) any
person who accepts hazardous waste for trajhsport to disposal sites se-
lected by that person and from which there is a release of hazardous
waste.2
The focus for lender liability cleanup costs is determining whether
the lender can be categorized as an "owner or operator. '22 As with the
12. 42 U.S.C. § 9631(b)(2) (1980) (repealed 1986).
13. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1613 (1986); see 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (Supp. V 1987).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (Supp. V 1987).
15. See id. § 9607(a)(4).
16. Id. § 9606(a) (Supp. V 1987).
17. Id. § 9604(c)(3) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
18. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-56-200 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (Supp. V 1987).
20. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(b) (Supp. V 1987); see Walls v. Waste Resources Corp., 761 F.2d
311, 318 (6th Cir. 1985).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. V 1987).
22. If the lender, or any other defendant, is found to be within one of the categories
1990]
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legislative history, the case law in this area is sparse. Because so few
reported cases exist dealing with these issues, the impact of individual
cases often tends to be exaggerated. Most of the reported cases are
federal district court decisions on motions either for summary judg-
ment or for dismissal. The review standards applied by courts in decid-
ing such motions are different than those used in deciding an appeal
after a final judgment.23 Nevertheless, prudent lenders should view
these cases as warnings and as bases for structuring sound lending
practices to avoid environmental liability.
In United States v. Mirabile24 the Pennsylvania District Court
stated that "participation in operational, production or waste disposal
activities" would result in liability under CERCLA.25 The Mirabile
case was before the court on motions for summary judgment by the
three defendant financial institutions: Mellon Bank, Inc. (Mellon); The
Small Business Administration (SBA); and American Bank and Trust
(ABT).2 The focus of the court's inquiry was whether the activities of
the financial institutions had risen to the level of an "owner or opera-
of potentially liable persons, then the lender will be strictly liable for response costs
unless it can avail itself of one of the specific defenses enumerated under CERCLA. See
United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 991
(D.S.C. 1984), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. United States v.
Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989). When
the harm is indivisible, defendants have joint and several liability for response costs. Id.
at 994. The liable defendants may seek contribution from each other. 42 U.S.C. §
9613(f)(1) (Supp. V 1987). A settling party, however, shall not be liable for claims for
contribution arising from matters addressed in the settlement. Id. § 9613(f)(2).
23. In reviewing a motion for summary judgment,
the nonmoving party is in a favorable posture, being entitled "to have the
credibility of his evidence as forecast assumed, his version of all that is in dis-
pute accepted, all internal conflicts in it resolved favorably to him, the most
favorable of possible alternative inferences from it drawn on his behalf; and
finally, to be given the benefit of all favorable legal theories invoked by the
evidence as considered."
Ro3s v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 364 (4th Cir. 1985) (quoting
Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir. 1979); see Pulliam Inv. Co.
v. Cameo Properties, 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir. 1987)).
In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), all
doubts must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party and a dismissal should not be
granted unless "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which entitle him to relief." Chiles v. Crooks, 708 F. Supp. 127, 129
(D.S.C. 1989) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
24. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
25. Id. at 20,995.
26. The three financial institutions were included in this suit pursuant to the third-
party claims of the Mirabiles. ABT obtained the property at a foreclosure sale, but as-
signed its successful bid to Anna and Thomas Mirabile. id. at 20,993. At the time the
suit was instituted by the government, the Mirabiles were the owners of the property. Id.
[Vol. 41
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tor" within the meaning of the statute.17 The court determined that
the SBA participated in financial decisions only, and thus granted the
SBA summary judgment .2 ABT took title to the property at the fore-
closure sale, but the court found that ABT met the security interest
exemption. 29 The court denied Mellon's motion for summary judg-
ment. The court decided that certain deposition testimony indicated
Mellon's involvement in day-to-day operations was sufficient to deny
summary judgment.3 0 Nevertheless, the court stated:
The reed upon which the Mirabiles seek to impose liability on Mellon
is slender indeed; however, bearing in mind that all doubts are to be
resolved in favor of that party opposing a motion for summary judg-
ment, I conclude that, taken as a whole, the deposition testimony out-
lined above presents a genuine issue of fact as to whether Mellon
Bank, through its predecessor Girard Bank, engaged in the sort of
participation in management which would bring a secured creditor
within the scope of CERCLA liability. In particular, it would be help-
ful to have a clearer picture of McWilliams' participation in the man-
ufacturing processes and of the extent to which Garfinkel acted at the
direction of Girard.3 1
Thus, the issue of ultimate CERCLA liability was far from resolved.
From a practical standpoint, however, Mellon Bank faced substantial
legal fees to defend the action and a realistic risk of a damaging ad-
27. Id. at 20,995. Individuals also may be held to be "owners or operators" under
CERCLA. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985)
(stockholder who manages corporation individually liable); United States v. Carolawn
Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,699, 20,700 (D.S.C. June 15, 1984).
28. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,997. The SBA had financed the operations of
Turco Coatings, Inc., the company that created the hazardous condition prior to foreclo-
sure. Id. at 20,995. Although the SBA had the right to participate in management, the
court found no evidence that it did so. Id. at 20,996. Furthermore, the SBA did not
foreclose on the site. Id. at 20,997.
29. Id. at 20,996. The court stated that the security interest exemption excludes
from the definition of "owners and operators" anyone who "without participating in
management of a ... facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security
interest in the ... facility." 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2)(A)(iii) (Supp. V 1987). This part of the
Mirabile decision has been criticized as incorrect. Some commentators have argued for
the imposition of a bright-line test which would establish "ownership" at the passage of
title. See, e.g., Lipper, supra note 8, at 147-48.
30. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,997, as with many other decisions in this area,
the procedural context of the ruling weakens any precedential value of the decision.
31. Id. McWilliams was the Mellon Bank loan officer who had post-bankruptcy
oversight of the company. Id. Girard Bank was Mellon Bank's predecessor-in-interest.
Id. at 20,996. Deposition testimony indicated that Girard insisted that Turco accept the
day-to-day supervision of Alfred Garfinkel in order to continue receiving operating funds
from Girard. Id. at 20,997.
1990]
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verse decision.2
When a lender would be considered an "owner" under CERCLA
was a primary focus of United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co."
Maryland Bank & Trust (MBT) commenced a foreclosure action on a
hazardous waste site in 1981 and purchased the property for. $381,500
at a foreclosure sale on May 15, 1982.34 After MBT refused to clean up
the site, the EPA did so and sued MBT under CERCLA for recovery
of over $500,000 in cleanup costs.
3 5
As in Mirabile,36 the case came before the court for resolution of
summary judgment motions.3 7 MBT contended it was not an "owner
and operator" under CERCLA.3a The statutory dispute revolved
around MBT's contention that it had to be both an owner and opera-
tor for CERCLA liability to attach s.3  The court, noting inadequate
Congressional draftsmanship,40 stated that current ownership facility is
32. The Mirabile case ultimately was resolved when the parties settled on the sec-
ond day of trial, October 2, 1985. See 1 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 710 (November 26, 1986).
33. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
34. Id. at 575.
35. Id. at 575-76.
36. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 4, 1985).
37. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 576.
38. Id. at 577. CERCLA Section 107(a) provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to
the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) The owner and operator of a vessel (otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States) or a facility,.
(4) ... shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Gov-
ernment or a State not ipconsistent with the national contingency plan ....
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. V 1987).
The definition of "owner or operator" is set forth in CERCLA Section 101(2)(A) in
pertinent part as follows:
"[o]wner or operator" means ... (iii) in the case of an abandoned facility,.
any person who owned, operated or otherwise controlled activities at such fa-
cility immediately beforehand. Such term does not include a person, who,
without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of
ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(iii) (1982 & Supp. V 1988).
39. See Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 577.
40. Id. at 578. The court commented:
The structure of Section 107(a), like so much of this hastily patched together
compromise Act, is not a model of statutory clarity.. . . Misuse of the definite
article is hardly surprising in a hastily conceived compromise statute such as
CERCLA, since members of Congress might well have had no time to dot all
the i's or cross all the t's.
[Vol. 41
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sufficient to bring a party within the coverage of CERCLA.4,
MBT also argued it fell within the security interest exemption
which excludes from liability those who do not participate in manage-
ment, but only hold "'indicia of ownership primarily to protect [their]
security interest in the ... facility.' "42 The court stated that when a
former mortgagee holds title through purchase at a foreclosure sale, it
is an "owner" and is subject to CERCLA liability.43 The court noted
that MBT held title to the site for nearly four years, and for one year
before the cleanup by the EPA.44 The court did not consider whether a
mortgagee purchasing consider whether a mortgagee purchasing at a
foreclosure sale and promptly reselling the property would meet the
security interest exemption.45 It indicated agreement with the Mirabile
decision, however, in which the purchasing mortgagee resold the site
after only four months and was found exempt from liability.
4
Lenders should not assume that a foreclosure purchase and subse-
quent sale of the property within four months will insulate the lender
from CERCLA liability. Even though legislation has been introduced
in Congress to limit lender liability in some cases,47 there is a risk of
CERCLA liability once title to contaminated property is passed. Con-
sistent with this, courts place the burden on lending institutions to
avoid the pitfalls of making loans secured by environmentally suspect
properties. For example, the court in Maryland Bank & Trust stated:
Mortgagees, however, already have the means to protect themselves,
by making prudent loans. Financial institutions are in a position to
investigate and discover potential problems in their secured proper-
ties. For many lending institutions, such research is routine. CERCLA
will not absolve them from responsibility for their mistakes of
judgment.6
This view of the role of lending institutions makes an environmental
Id.
41. Id. at 577.
42. Id. at 578 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(iii) (Supp. V 1987)).
43. Id. at 579.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 579 n.5.
46. Id. at 580; see United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20,992 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
47. In April of 1989, Congressman John J. LaFalce (D-NY) introduced a bill in the
House of Representatives designed to limit CERCLA liability of commercial lending in-
stitutions acquiring facilities through foreclosure or similar means. See H.R. 2085, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. H1364 (daily ed. April 25, 1989).
48. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 580 (D. Md.
1986) (footnotes omitted).
1990]
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audit report a necessary part of most real estate loan packages.4 9
An environmental audit report also may assist in establishing the
"third party defense" 50 and the "innocent landowner" defense., Es-
sentially, the third party defense can be asserted when the contamina-
tion and damages are caused solely by a third party unconnected with
the defendant, and the defendant exercised due care with respect to
the contaminant while taking precautions against any foreseeable caus-
ative acts or omissions of the third party.52 In Maryland Bank & Trust
the government's motion for summary judgment asserted that MBT
could not meet its burden of proof on the third party defense.53 The
court agreed and found that material factual issues existed concerning
the contractual and business relations between MBT and the prior
owner and the reasonableness of MBT's conduct." Part of the factual
dispute was whether MBT knew the property was contaminated.5 5 An
49. See, King, Lenders' Liability For Cleanup Costs, 18 ENVTL. L. 241, 284-86
(1988); see also infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text (guidelines issued by Federal
Bank System for establishing an environmental risk policy includes a requirement of an
environmental risk report).
50. CERCLA section 107(b) establishes the "third party defense" to CERCLA lia-
bility. The section provides in pertinent part:
There shall be no liability ... for a person otherwise liable who can establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat of release of a
hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely
by ... an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of
the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a
contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant...
if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he
exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, taking
into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of
all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against fore-
seeable acts or omissions of any such third party and the consequences that
could foreseeably result from such acts or omissions ....
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
51. The "innocent landowner" defense is set forth in the definition of "contractual
relationship" under SARA. If a lender "did not know and had no reason to know" of
contamination when the facility was acquired, then the defense may be available. 42
U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1987). The defense is difficult to assert successfully
because at the time of acquisition, defendant must have "all appropriate inquiry into the
previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with good commercial or custom-
ary practice. . . ... Id. § 9601(35)(B). In other words, the lender must conduct an appro-
priate environmental audit prior to making a loan to be secured by real property.
52. See supra note 50.
53. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 581 (D. Md.
1986).
54. Id. at 581-82. Ultimately, the case was settled the day before the scheduled trial.
See King, supra note 49, at 273 n.143 (1988).
55. It is interesting to note that MBT knew at some point that the borrower oper-
ated a trash and garbage business on the site. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at
[Vol. 41
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environmental audit report would be evidence of the status of the site
at the time of the loan.
A case that arose in Texas, Tanglewood East Homeowners v.
Charles-Thomas, Inc.,56 provides little guidance at this time, but could
result in additional opinions as the case progresses. The plaintiffs are a
group of subdivision property owners seeking damages, response and
cleanup costs, and injunctive relief under both CERCLA and RCRA.57
First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Conroe (First Federal), a
lending institution, also was named as a defendant." First Federal,
along with defendant residential developers, construction companies,
and real estate agents and agencies, allegedly participated in the devel-
opment of the plaintiffs' subdivision. 59 The subdivision was the former
location of the United Creosoting Company and was contaminated
with creosote poles which were allegedly buried by defendants when
residential development commenced."
Defendants made a joint motion to dismiss the case under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)"1 for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion, and 12(b)(6)62 for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted.6 3 Not surprisingly, the motions were denied by the district
court and the rulings were affirmed by the Fifth Circuit on interlocu-
tory appeal. 4 The sole appellant was First Federal, which, for reasons
not stated in the record, made its contentions on behalf of all defend-
ants.61 For this reason, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals did not ad-
dress the defenses that may be available to a lending institution.6
575. Also, the loans were made to the borrower for his two businesses-Greater St.
Mary's Disposal, Inc. and Waldorf Sanitation of St. Mary's, Inc. Id. Other than a loan
secured by a property called "The Hazardous Waste Dump," it is difficult to imagine a
lender having more reason to suspect a loan would lead to environmental litigation than
did the lender in Maryland Bank & Trust.
56. Id. at 1568.
57. Tanglewood, 849 F.2d at 1571.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. The cleanup was expected to cost millions of dollars and require the demoli-
tion of six houses and construction of bunkers to contain the hazardous materials. Id.
61. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
63. Tanglewood, 849 F.2d at 1571-72.
64. Id. at 1576. Since the case was before the Fifth Circuit on a motion to dismiss,
the court accepted all the allegations of the complaint as true. Id. at 1571-72. As stated
by the court, "Such a motion will be granted only if 'it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief.'" Id. at 1572 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)).
65. Id.
66. First Federal was in essence alleged to be a joint developer. Since the court of
appeals took the complaint's allegations to be true in reviewing the district court's rul-
1990]
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The Tanglewood court stated that the defendants could qualify as
present owners,67 past owners,6 8 and post arrangers and transporters, 9
and thus be subject to CERCLA liability.70 The importance of the rul-
ing is its consistency with the decisions that support the broad scope of
CERCLA liability. Thus, another warning is sounded for the benefit of
financial institutions and others exposed to CERCLA liability.
In United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.7 1 a chief subject of inquiry
involved determining when a lender becomes an operator for purposes
of CERCLA liability. The lender, Fleet Factors Corp. (Fleet), was ad-
vancing funds to Swainsboro Print Works (SPW) against the assign-
ment of SPW's accounts receivable.72 As additional collateral, Fleet re-
ceived a security interest in all of SPW's inventory, equipment, and
fixtures, as well as SPW's real estate or plant facility.7 3 In August 1979,
SPW filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and Fleet continued to advance
funds to SPW as debtor-in-possession pursuant to an agreement ap-
proved by the bankruptcy court. 4 Almost a year and a half after the
bankruptcy filing, Fleet ceased advancing funds and SPW ceased oper-
ations.7 5 SPW was later adjudged bankrupt under Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code, and a liquidation of assets was initiated.7 6 Fleet
foreclosed on some of the inventory and equipment, but not on the real
estate.
In May 1982, Fleet entered into a contract with Baldwin Industrial
Liquidators (Baldwin) to auction some of SPW's inventory and equip-
ment.77 In June 1982, Baldwin sold the items "as is" and "in place.
' '1 8
All purchasers had the responsibility to remove their purchases. In au-
ing, such allegations would be sufficient at the motion to dismiss stage to overcome a
security interest exemption defense. Also, First Federal probably would have to offer
some evidence that it could meet the security interest exemption. Such an evidentiary
offering would convert the motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion. Of
course, First Federal still could raise the issue by summary judgment after the decision
on the motion to dismiss by the Fifth Circuit. See id. at 1571-72.
67. Id. at 1572-73 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. V 1987)). The court relied upon
United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986), to sup-
port its ruling. Tanglewood, 849 F. Supp. at 1573.
68. Tanglewood, 849 F.2d at 1573 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (Supp. V 1987)).
69. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3)-(4) (Supp. V 1987)).
70. Id. at 1572-75.
71. 724 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Ga. 1988).
72. Id. at 957.
73. Id.
74. Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to submit a plan to reorgan-
ize and restructure debts. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1988).
75. Fleet Factors, 724 F. Supp. at 957-58.
76. Id. at 958.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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gust 1982, Fleet contracted with Nix Rigging Company (Nix) to remove
the remaining equipment, and "to leave the premises in 'broom clean'
condition. '7 9 Nix left the facility in December 1983.80
In 1984, an EPA inspection allegedly found asbestos and approxi-
mately seven hundred fifty-five-gallon drums containing toxic chemi-
cals. The EPA spent almost $400,000 to clean the site. The government
sued Fleet Factors and other individual defendants for the cleanup
costs relating to the removal of the drums and asbestos allegedly dis-
turbed by Nix or the purchasers."'
The case was before the court on motions for summary judgment
by both the government and Fleet. 2 The court focused on three time
periods in determining whether Fleet was an "operator" under CER-
CLA: the period before the auction; the period after Baldwin entered
the facility to prepare for the auction until the time Nix left; and the
period between the time Nix left and a tax foreclosure sale in July
1987.83
Although the court denied Fleet's summary judgment motion, it
ruled as a matter of law that Fleet was not an owner or operator of the
facility after Nix left the facility. 4 The court found that Fleet never
foreclosed on the property, had no control over or access to the facility
nor engaged in any activities there between the time Nix left the site
and the time of the tax lien foreclosure.8 5 The court ruled that during
the relevant period Fleet had protected its security interest without
participating in "day-to-day management."' 6
Without providing further guidance as to the court's factual analy-
sis, the court concluded as a matter of law that Fleet's activities before
the auction by Baldwin did not constitute sufficient involvement in
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 959.
82. See id.
83. Id. at 960. The government conceded that Fleet never was an "owner" of the
facility under CERCLA. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. The Fleet Factors court offered the following statutory construction of 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2):
I interpret the phrases "participating in the management of a. . . facility" and
"primarily to protect his security interest," to permit secured creditors to pro-
vide financial assistance and general, and even isolated instances of specific,
management advice to its debtors without risking CERCLA liability if the se-
cured creditor does not participate in the day-to-day management of the busi-
ness or facility either before or after the business ceases operation.
Id. at 960 (ellipsis and emphasis original) (citing United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
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management for liability to attach under CERCLA. 17
Finally, the court found Fleet's alleged activities through Baldwin
and Nix sufficient to create genuine issues of material fact which could
not be resolved by motion for summary judgment.8 The government
alleged that Baldwin moved barrels of toxic chemicals prior to the auc-
tion, and that Nix or the equipment purchasers disturbed friable as-
bestos on pipes connected to the equipment not sold at the auction."9
The alleged condition of the plant after the departure of Baldwin, Nix
and the purchasers created the threat to public health and environ-
ment which required the government to incur the ultimate response
costs. 90
The Fleet decision presents two clear warnings for lenders. First,
lenders may be held liable under CERCLA when the foreclosure of a
security interest arguably contributes to or causes an environmental
hazard. Second, lenders must take care in contracting with others to
handle hazardous substances, or even allowing others access to areas
containing hazardous or potentially hazardous materials.
IM. RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT
Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA)YI in 1976 to provide comprehensive, prospective regulation of
the generation, treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste.
Congress designed the Act to accomplish this goal through a detailed
permitting system for treatment, storage, and disposal (TSD) facilities
and a manifest system for the transportation of hazardous waste.2
RCRA, therefore, imposes a "cradle-to-grave" system of regulation for
hazardous waste that focuses primarily on existing and future activi-
ties. Congress amended RCRA in 1984 by enacting the Hazardous and
Solid Waste Amendments.9 3 The amendments provided the EPA with
expanded permitting authority and increased enforcement authority to
deal with violators.
RCRA is not directly applicable to lenders in most situations. Nor-
mally, RCRA only affects lenders in the sense that it reduces bottom
line profit, which either affects the borrower's ability to replay its loan
or reduces the value of the collateral. As RCRA permitting regulations
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6907 (West 1983 & Supp. 1989).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 6925 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
93. Pub. L. No. 98-616, title I, § 101(a), 98 Stat. 3224 (1984) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 9601 (Supp. V 1987)).
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have expanded, the cost of compliance also has increased.94 RCRA per-
mits for TSD facilities impose potential cleanup obligations upon the
permit holder.9 5 The 1984 RCRA amendments require, as a condition
of the TSD permit, cleanup of any release from a solid waste manage-
ment unit (SWMU) regardless of when the release occurred.98 Cleanup
may be required for a release of a regulated substance from an interim
status facility.97 Additionally, the EPA has adopted regulations which
prohibit the installation of underground storage tanks that will not
prevent the release regulated substances."" The regulations also require
owners of underground storage tanks to notify state or local agencies of
the existence of the tanks.99 Therefore, a TSD facility may be required
to correct problems caused by old disposal practices, including those
implemented or caused by a prior owner, as a condition to continuation
of its business. Furthermore, RCRA permits require closure provisions,
including financial assurance provisions that the permittee will clean
up the site once the permit terminates. 0 0
TSD facilities under RCRA are subject to other sources of liabil-
ity. The EPA can impose cleanup orders and penalties, both civil and
criminal, for violation of the Act.101 Both the EPA and citizens can
institute legal action to require cleanup of contamination that poses an
"imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or wel-
fare or the environment" caused by past or present handling, treat-
ment, storage, or disposal of a regulated substance. 10
The courts have given broad interpretation to the substantial en-
dangerment provision of RCRA. In United States v. Price'0 3 the court
concluded that although RCRA does not provide the government with
general cleanup authority for dormant waste sites, it does provide sub-
stantial authority to limit further harm to the environment. 04 For ex-
94. See generally 40 C.F.R. §§ 260-265 (1989) (hazardous waste management
requirements).
95. See United States v. Waste Indus., 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984); United States
v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361 (D.N.H. 1985). Both Waste Industries and
Ottati recognize the EPA's authority to maintain an action to require waste storage
groups to abate the threat of public health and environment caused by leaking hazardous
waste.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(u), (v) (Supp. V 1987).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(h) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
98. 40 C.F.R. § 280 (1989).
99. Id. § 280.50.
100. Id. §§ 112, 264.143.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d), (g) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
102. Id. § 9606(a); see also id. §§ 6928(a)(1), 6972 (provisions allowing civil suits by
citizens and the EPA).
103. 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982).
104. Id. at 1070-71.
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ample, under RCRA the government may restrain the continued leak-
ing of contaminants from a landfill into the environment."0 5 The court
reached this conclusion, in part, because of the broad definition of dis-
posal, which includes the leaking of hazardous substances from the
landfill into the groundwater. 06 Potential liability was imposed upon
the property owners even though all disposal had ceased before their
purchase of the property. Although the purchasers had knowledge of
the landfill prior to purchase, the court indicated that a purchaser
without knowledge may be liable because a sophisticated investor has a
duty to investigate the actual condition of the property or take the
property as it is.1'0 7 The court further concluded that purchasers with-
out knowledge may be liable because the legislative history indicates a
congressional intention to construe the disposal definition broadly.0 8 It
should be noted that RCRA does not contain an "innocent landowner"
defense as does CERCLA.1 9 Therefore, a lender which takes title to
property to protect its security interest may be subject to cleanup lia-
bility under RCRA even though such liability could not be imposed
under CERCLA.
Banks also encounter potential RCRA liability when they hold ti-
tle to property as trustee. A bank-trustee, as an owner of a facility, is
responsible for fines and penalties when a tenant fails to comply with
RCRA." 0 A significant source of such liability for bank-trustees is the
underground storage tank (UST) provisions of RCRA added by the
1984 amendment. 1 ' The UST regulations promulgated by the EPA re-
quire notification of the size, age, location and contents of USTs."n
These same regulations provide for modification and retrofit of existing
systems over the next ten years,"" and provide cleanup requirements
for any UST that leaks a regulated substance to the environment."4
Banks should ensure that their borrowers and trust departments com-
ply with the UST regulations, since failure to comply will result in sig-
nificant statutory penalties."15
105. Id. at 1071.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1073.
108. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5019, 5023).
109. For the text of CERCLA's "innocent landovmer" defense provisions, see 42
U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(A)(i) (West 1983 & Supp. 1989).
110. See 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (Supp. V 1987); 40 C.F.R. § 260.10 (1989).
111. See 42 U.S.C. § 6991 (Supp. V 1987).
112. 40 C.F.R. § 280.22 (1989).
113. Id. § 280.21.
114. Id. §§ 280.60-.67.
115. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928(d), (g), 6991d(b)(2), 6991e(d) (1982 & Supp. V
1987).
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RCRA encourages the individual states to formulate and enforce
their own hazardous waste management plans consistent with the
Act.11 In South Carolina, DHEC has this authority and, within the
parameters of the state plan, may promulgate and enforce regulations
for handling of hazardous waste. 1 7 Notwithstanding this delegation of
authority, the EPA retains its ability to enforce the federally based
program and all the rights attendant to that power." 8
As with RCRA, the South Carolina Hazardous Waste Management
Act is predominantly a regulatory statute and normally will not affect
lenders directly unless they actively participate in management and
operation of a facility that falls within the scope of the regulations."'
Borrowers, however, may be subject both to DHEC and EPA regula-
tions. Fines, penalties and injunctions may impair a borrower's ability
to continue business or meet obligations it has to lenders. A clear ex-
ample of how much liability a borrower can incur as a result of EPA
and DHEC regulations is found in United States v. T & S Brass and
Bronze Works, Inc."20 The defendant, a South Carolina manufacturer
who violated several permitting requirements of RCRA, was fined
$1,000 per day (for a total of $194,000) by the EPA (the potential fine
was $25,000 per day) and also was fined $19,500 by DHEC. In addition,
the defendant was compelled to clean up its existing in-ground hazard-
ous waste disposal site and was forced to refit its facility with above
ground storage tanks. Thus, the enormous expense which violations of
RCRA or DHEC regulations may bring should be a source of concern
for every lender. Lenders should protect their interests by closely eval-
uating the past and present practices of potential borrowers for possi-
ble violations of any environmental laws.
IV. CONCLUSION
The potential liability under the federal and South Carolina
superfund and hazardous waste laws is so great that lenders must take
steps to protect themselves against the various legal and business risks
that arise. The statutes and relevant cases discussed this Article
116. See id. § 6947 (1982).
117. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-56-10 to -840 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1989).
118. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6927(a), 6928, 6973 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
119. DHEC has promulgated Hazardous Waste Management Regulations under au-
thority of the South Carolina Hazardous Waste Management Act. See S.C. CODE REGS.
61-79.124, -79.260 to- -79.266, -79.268, -79.270 (1989). DHEC does not yet have full RCRA
permitting authority and the EPA has not approved a state plan for the additional per-
mitting requirements imposed by the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984.
120. 681 F. Supp. 314 (D.S.C. 1988), modified, 865 F.2d 1261 (4th Cir. 1989) (up-
holding fine and injunction with technical modification).
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demonstrate that lenders must closely scrutinize borrowers with envi-
ronmental compliance problems, cautiously avoid excessive participa-
tion in the business affairs of the borrower, carefully evaluate the envi-
ronmental condition of real estate as security for a loan, and prudently
consider potential environmental problems in the foreclosure decision.
In order to minimize exposure to environmental liability, lenders
should develop an environmental risk and liability policy. The Office of
Regulatory Activities of the Federal Home Loan Bank System has is-
sued a bulletin that contains a guideline for establishing an environ-
mental risk policy. 21 The bulletin identifies the following components
as essential for a lender's environmental risk policy:
1. A stated assessment of potential environmental problems and lia-
bilities ... and a declaration that a policy of due diligence is adopted
to protect the institution from such risks.
2. A requirement that loan applicants provide information on envi-
ronmental matters pertaining to their business and facilities. Institu-
tions should develop a form covering specific questions to which appli-
cants respond. The questions should request information concerning
past, present or proposed uses of the proposed collateral, potential
hazards, insurance availability for the property as it pertains to envi-
ronmental matters, and contracts by any Federal, state, or local gov-
ernment agencies concerning environmental matters that must be re-
solved in order to obtain business and environmental permits.
3. A requirement that an acquiring institution, in a purchase or par-
ticipation loan, ensure that adequate due diligence regarding environ-
mental risk matters has been met by the lead lender and a require-
ment that all loans sold to Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae meet with the
environmental due diligence standards imposed by those agencies.
4. A requirement that all loan requests, in which the proposed real
property collateral has a higher environmental risk potential than
other types of real property, have a Phase I Environmental Risk Re-
port ... prepared for the institution prior to approval of the loan.'
12
In addition to the components identified by the Thrift Bulletin,
lenders also should consider inclhding protective provisions in loan
documents,' 2' requiring adequate insurance coverage, and minimizing
their involvement in business affairs of borrowers. An environmental
risk policy is no guarantee that a lender will not face environmental
liability, but it will minimize any potential liability and reduce the
chance that the institution will make high-risk loans.
121. See FEDERAL HOME LoAN BANK SYSTEM, OFFICE OF REGULATORY AcTIvImrs,
THRiFT BULLETIN TB 16 (February 6, 1989).
122. Id. at 2.
123. These provisions might include covenants, representations and warranties, and
indemnification clauses.
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